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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate a structural model of the domestic US airline market to analyze the eect of
the recent merger between American Airlines and US Airways. Our results show that, between 2011 and
2016, a substantial fuel price drop in conjunction with changes in consumer preferences toward direct ights
completely rationalizes the observed decrease in prices. However, we estimate that, during the same period,
more than half of the consumer welfare increase is due, on top of these environmental changes, to the
ex-post optimization of the networks of the newly merged airline and of its competitors.
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1 Introduction
Over the last 25 years, the US airline industry has faced a drastic reduction in the number of
legacy carriers operating on the domestic market through two merger waves; one following the 9/11
crisis and the other due to the global nancial crisis of 2008 (see Philippon, 2019). Thus, the six
legacy carriers in operation in 2005 have now consolidated into three legacy carriers: American
Airlines, Delta Airlines and United Airlines (see Carlton et al., 2019). The last merger occurred
between American Airlines and US Airways, who announced their intention to merge in 2013. The
announcement followed two years of American Airlines operating under bankruptcy protection. It
created one of the world's largest airlines and drew considerable attention from all stakeholders.
As a result, the antitrust division of the US Department of Justice (DoJ), along with several state
attorneys general, led a lawsuit in August 2013 seeking to block the merger. The main argument
was that the merger would considerably lessen competition and increase fares, resulting in harm to
consumers (see Peterman, 2014).
From the theoretical literature, we know that two opposing forces exist in horizontal mergers
in oligopolistic markets. On the one hand, the number of competitors decreases and may lead to
a monopoly in some specic markets or a quasi-monopoly if the competitors oer products that
are not close substitutes (such as a connecting ight versus a direct one). Monopolization was a
major concern of the DoJ when ling the lawsuit. On the other hand, a merger may induce some
cost reduction through the rationalization of the network (i.e., exploiting the economies of scale
or density generated from a more extensive network), or through the reduction in sta or aircraft
maintenance to eliminate redundant entities. These cost reductions can impact the prices charged
to consumers. Finally, competitors that are more aggressive on prices can react by entering some
markets where there is possible room for competition. In addition, a larger network post-merger
can be benecial to consumers who can reach more destinations.
In this paper, we evaluate the eect on prices and consumer surplus of the merger between
American Airlines and US Airways through the estimation of a structural model of the US domestic
airline industry. In doing so, we propose an ex-post evaluation of this merger. During the period
studied (2011 to 2016), the fuel price dropped by almost two-thirds, causing a drop in the marginal
cost of more than 10%. Additionally, the dierent airlines reacted to this new merger by rationalizing
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their networks. Indeed, the new entity eliminated overlaps and connecting ights when there were
direct ights already proposed. Competitors did the same. Furthermore, this period saw the entry
of a number of low-cost carriers (LCCs), who took advantage of new slot availabilities and reduced
competition due to the merger. Indeed, one merger remedy was for the newly merged entity to
sell slots at several airports, mainly at the Ronald Reagan International Airport and LaGuardia
Airport. The slot divestiture at LaGuardia allowed Southwest Airlines and JetBlue to buy slots
there for the rst time.1 Finally, consumer preferences changed and the willingness to pay for ying
directly increased over the period, a shift already noticed by Berry and Jia (2010) during a former
period. Accounting for these changes is crucial in an ex-post analysis of a merger, therefore, nding
a reference scenario for conducting a dierence-in-dierences analysis may be somewhat challenging.
Estimating a structural model allows us to disentangle eects directly related to the merger from
those that occurred independently.
We use pre- and post-merger fares data from the US Department of Transportation from the
second quarter of both 2011 and 2016. In our main analysis, we estimate that airfares should have
dropped on average by 6.73% and, therefore, consumer surplus should have increased by around
6.67%, had the supply of ights been the same in 2016 as in 2011. This assumption states that
there is no merger and no further entry from LCCs or any other airline but allows for changes in
fuel price and consumer preferences. When comparing the 2011 and 2016 data directly, we observe
an average decrease in prices of 6.59% and an average increase in consumer surplus of 14.35%. As a
result, we can overwhelmingly attribute the decrease in prices observed between 2011 and 2016 to
changes in marginal costs and preferences. The merger and the entry/exit decisions of both the new
entity and its competitors slightly increased prices and considerably increased consumer surplus by
proposing more direct ights. However, it is very dicult to predict what would have been the
entry/exit decisions between 2011 and 2016 without such a merger.
As detailed below in the literature review, ex-post merger analyses have traditionally been
conducted with reduced-form models. We employ a structural approach in this paper. There has




structural model. Both have their advantages and drawbacks and can be seen as complementary.
They have their own sets of implicit or explicit assumptions, in terms of the behavior of the economic
agents, linearities of the functional forms, and the stationarity of the environment over the period
considered. Most of the empirical literature using structural models has focused on simulating the
impact of mergers on prices and welfare before the merger has occurred. The rst step consists of
estimating the demand and supply sides of the industry. The second step is to use these estimations
to simulate the merger impact (see, among others, Berry and Pakes, 1993; Nevo, 2001; Peters,
2006) using pre-dened scenarios. However, ex-post merger analyses have been receiving increasing
attention, both from policymakers and researchers (Buccirossi et al., 2008; Ilzkovitz and Dierx,
2020). We contribute to this literature by decomposing the dierence in price and consumer surplus
between 2011 and 2016 into dierent ctitious steps, such as changes in consumer preferences and
marginal costs that are not directly caused by the merger, the merger itself, and the entry/exit
reactions of both the newly merged entity and the other airlines. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the rst to employ such a structural decomposition. We also contribute to the literature
studying airline mergers by separating price eects from market structure eects ex-post.
Following earlier structural work (Chen and Gayle, 2019; Gayle and Yimga, 2018), we estimate
a nested logit model. Then, with estimates in hand, we perform several counterfactual exercises to
evaluate the merger between American Airlines and US Airways. First, we simulate the no-merger
case, keeping the market structure constant, but letting the demand and supply parameters take on
their 2016 values. Doing so allows us to isolate changes in preferences and marginal costs unrelated
to the merger. We nd substantial heterogeneity in price and consumer surplus changes across
market structures. Markets where both merging parties oered direct ights before the merger saw
signicant increases in consumer surplus. This increase is mainly due to changes in the merging
entity's network and the entry of competitors. On the contrary, markets where only one of the
merging parties was present saw consumer surplus decrease. This decrease is mainly due to the exit
of either the merged entity or competitors. Overall, consumer surplus increased due to the merger
and the entry/exit decisions of airlines.
The remaining part of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature.
Section 3 introduces the data used and presents a descriptive analysis of the eect of the merger.
Section 4 presents the demand and supply model and the estimation method. Section 5 analyzes the
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estimates using the 2011 and 2016 waves of the DB1B data. Section 6 presents the counterfactual
analysis of our merger simulation and Section 7 concludes. The Supplemental Material available
online2 contains appendices that provide a robustness check of our results and more details about
our GMM estimation method.
2 Literature review
This paper relates and contributes to several strands of literature. First, there exists a vast literature
on merger simulation using structural estimations of demand and supply. Hausman et al. (1994)
simulate a merger in the beer industry. Nevo (2001) simulates a merger in the ready-to-eat cereal
sector, using a random coecients model à la BLP (1995). Ivaldi and Verboven (2005) simulate a
merger between two truck producers, Volvo and Scania, using a nested logit demand estimation.
Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016) propose a post-merger comparison of a merger simulation in the
Swedish Analgesics Market by comparing simulated prices and actual prices. We contribute to this
literature by extending ex-post merger analysis to consider changes in market structure, as well as
considering pure price eects.
Second, a large literature studies past mergers in the airline industry, mostly in reduced form.
Borenstein (1990) looks into the mergers that occurred in the mid-1980 in an ex-post way and detects
anti-competitive eects of the mergers. Similar evidence of price increases is also revealed by Werden
et al. (1991), Kim and Singal (1993), and Morrison (1996) when examining other mergers in the
same period. Bilotkach (2011) studies the eects of multi-market contact on frequency following
the merger between US Airways and America West. Luo (2014) studies the price eects of the
Delta/Northwest merger using regression techniques. Building on Bajari et al.'s (2007) approach,
Benkard et al. (2020) study the eects of horizontal mergers from a dynamic perspective. Following
Nevo's (2001) approach, Peters (2006) conducts merger simulations for ve mergers in the airline
industry and makes a comparison between the simulated prices and the actual post-merger prices,
as in Björnerstedt and Verboven (2016). Some recent studies investigate the eect of a merger on
2It can be downloaded from https://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/by/bontemp
s/bontemps_remmy_wei_suppl_mat.pdf
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product quality (Mazzeo, 2003; Rupp et al., 2006; Prince and Simon, 2009; Chen and Gayle, 2019;
Rupp and Tan, 2019). Bontemps et al. (2021) propose a two-stage model endogenizing carriers'
choices of their networks and use it to predict the change post-merger network structures. Several
papers investigate the American Airlines-US Airways merger. Using dierences-in-dierences (DID),
Carlton et al. (2019) claim that the recent legacy mergers, including that of American Airlines and
US Airways, were pro-competitive. More recently, Das (2019) simulates the merger of American
Airlines and US Airways, using ex-ante simulation and estimating the marginal cost reduction
necessary to t the actual 2016 prices. He examines the eects of this merger on product quality
and price, using both DID and merger simulation methods. Ciliberto et al. (2020) extend the merger
simulation approach by allowing endogenous entry decisions and also examine the merger between
American Airlines and US Airways.
We contribute to this literature in dierent ways. Contrary to Benkard et al. (2020); Ciliberto
et al. (2020); Bontemps et al. (2021) who make ex-ante predictions about post-merger market
structures, we provide an ex-post analysis of changes in market structure. Also, we disentangle
changes in prices and consumer surplus directly related to the merger from those not related to
the merger and caused by exogenous changes in preferences and costs. Then, we contribute to this
literature by documenting large changes in preferences and costs between 2011 and 2016. Here, we
connect to the work of Berry and Jia (2010).
Finally, our paper connects to the literature on the structural estimation of demand and supply,
which is now the reference in the new empirical industrial organization (IO) literature. Since Berry
et al. (1995) developed a random coecients model, many papers have applied the discrete-choice-
type demand models to airline markets. Berry et al. (2006) use a random coecients model to
study the role of hubs. Armantier and Richard (2008) measure the welfare outcomes of the code-
share agreement. Berry and Jia (2010) investigate the factors that aect airlines' protability by
comparing demand and supply outcomes between 1999 and 2006. Ciliberto and Williams (2014)
examine the potential collusive behavior in the US airline industry and nd evidence that carriers
with little multi-market contact do not cooperate in setting fares. Ruiz-Pérez (2019) considers the
underlying common ownership structures of airlines by nancial institutions and studies how it
aects entry decisions and price competition. Gayle and Yimga (2018) estimate a nested logit for
the demand for air transport and evaluate the impact of airlines' on-time performances.
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3 Data and descriptive analysis
3.1 Data and summary statistics
The primary data source we use in our paper is the DB1B database provided by the US Department
of Transportation, available online.3 It consists of a 10% random sample of ticket records for the US
domestic airline market in a given quarter. Since we are interested in the demand and supply sides
before and after the merger, we select two samples from before and after the merger, respectively.
The pre-merger sample comes from the second quarter of 2011, more than one year before American
Airlines and US Airways ocially announced their intent to merge (February 2013). The post-
merger sample comes from the second quarter of 2016, more than one year after the Federal Aviation
Administration granted a single operating certicate for US Airways and American Airlines (April
2015).4
We exploit the tables "Ticket" and "Market" of this database, keeping the tickets corresponding
to the trips between the top 49 US metropolitan areas ("cities" hereafter).5 Both one-way tickets
and return tickets are in the nal sample. Following the usual treatment of these data (see, for
example, Berry and Jia, 2010), the tickets with more than one stop and multiple operating or
ticketing carriers are deleted. We deate the prices in the 2016 data and all prices are in real 2011
US$. In our work, we dene a market t ∈ T as a non-directional city pair, with T collecting all
city pairs in our sample. A non-directional market implies that a ight from A to B and a ight
from B to A are in the same market. Also, we do not model the competition between the dierent
airports in a given city.
In a given market, dierent airlines may propose dierent products. Airlines can choose to oer
a direct ight between the origin and destination (OD). Alternatively, they can provide a one-stop
ight with a connection at an intermediate airport. We dene a product on the itinerary level. Two
ights oered by the same airline with the same endpoints but with a dierent connecting airport
are two dierent products. This product denition explains why we have many more one-stop than
3See the website, https://www.transtats.bts.gov
4Aircraft with the US Airways livery ceased to y in October 2015.
5We keep the metropolitan areas with population over one million inhabitants.
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direct products in our sample (see Table 3). A product in a given OD market is therefore a trip by
air proposed by a given airline, with or without a connection and, if the ight is connecting, the
identity of the connecting city.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics at the product level. The average price decreased by
6.59% from $194.33 in 2011 to $181.52 in 2016. Since we only keep the observations with at most
one stop, the number of stops varies between zero and one, and the mean values show that most
of the products are direct ights (see also Table 3). Connections is the maximum number of cities
that an airline oers direct service to out of the two OD cities.6
[Include Table 1]
We present some market-level statistics in Table 2. Compared to 2011, the number of products
per market increased in 2016. As expected, the number of rms per market decreased from 2011
to 2016. Entry by competitors of the merging entities did not compensate for losing one legacy
carrier in most of the markets considered in our sample. The trend of having more direct passengers
underlined in Berry and Jia (2010) has continued through our sample period.
[Include Table 2]
3.2 A descriptive analysis of the merger: impact on the network
First, we propose a descriptive analysis of the network of the main airlines before and after the
merger. We consider the major carriers (United Airlines (UA), Delta Airlines (DL), American
Airlines (AA), US Airways (US), and Southwest Airlines (WN)) separately. We collect the remaining
carriers into a group called LCC.7 Table 3 displays the main carrier-level statistics in 2011 and 2016.
6If an airline oers direct service to ve cities out of endpoint A and direct service to 15 cities out of endpoints
B, Connections is equal to 15.
7These low-cost carriers are Alaska Airlines (AS), JetBlue Airways (B6), Allegiant Air (G4), Frontier Airlines
(F9), Spirit Airlines (NK), Sun Country Airlines (SY), US 3,000 Airlines (U5), AirTran Airways (FL), and Virgin
America (VX). Between 2011 and 2016, AirTrans merged with Southwest Airlines, and US 3,000 Airlines ceased
operations, meaning they are no longer part of our sample in 2016.
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Before the merger, American Airlines and US Airways were not as large as the two other major
airlines, Delta and United Airlines. However, the merger helped AA overtake Delta and United
in terms of passengers and markets served. It is also noteworthy that Southwest Airlines was
the largest airline in terms of passengers served, despite serving fewer markets. This fact reects
Southwest's dierent policy, which mostly oers direct ights. Between 2011 and 2016, the share
of legacy carriers has continued to decrease, a trend observed during the last 20 years.
[Include Table 3]
In Tables 4 and 5, we display some descriptive statistics of the main airlines' networks for 2011
and 2016. For 2011, we also create a ctive entity, "AA + US", by combining all the direct ights of
the individual rms, thus eliminating all duplicate products. Here, a city is a node of the network,
and a link between two cities exists if an airline operates a direct ight between at least one airport in
each of these two cities. The rst two lines report the number of cities connected by each airline and
the number of links. At rst glance, it is clear that the networks are not fully connected, thanks
to the (partial) hub and spoke system operated by the major airlines. Southwest, historically a
point-to-point operator, has more links than the major airlines. However, we do see a trend in the
rationalization of the networks of major airlines. Delta had 326 direct ights from these cities in
2011 and only 287 (around 12% less) in 2016. The ctive entity AA+US in 2011 would have oered
468 direct ights. However, American Airlines only oers 427 direct ights in 2016, connecting all
the cities in our sample. This decrease suggests that AA altered its network by cutting some direct
routes and making full use of US Airways' former hubs.
Similarly, the average path length (the path length between two cities is the minimum number
of links necessary to join these two cities)8 slightly increased during this period for all airlines. In
contrast, the average degree (i.e., the average number of cities directly connected to a given city)
for the legacy carriers decreased because some direct routes were cut. Finally, the average closeness,
which measures the inverse of the average length to reach any city from a given one) decreased since
the average path length increased.
[Include Tables 4 and 5]
8A direct ight has a path length of one, a connecting ight, through a hub, a path length of two.
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Next, we focus on some node-level characteristics. For each merging party, in 2011 and 2016, we
calculate the centrality measures (degree and closeness)9 by city and rank them accordingly. The
gures are reported in Table 6. We focus on the top-ve nodes for each merging airline in 2011.
Unsurprisingly, these top-ve nodes coincide with each carrier's hubs. In an airline network, a rm
can select some central airports as "hubs" that link to many other airports. In 2011, American
Airlines had six hubs: Chicago (ORD), Dallas (DFW), Los Angeles (LAX), New York (JFK, LGA),
and Miami (MIA). US Airways had four hubs: Charlotte (CLT), Philadelphia (PHL), Phoenix
(PHX), and Washington (DCA). JFK is the fth most important node in US Airways' network.
The most inuential nodes in American Airlines' network in 2016 include the pre-merger hubs of
both airlines. Thus, we see that the merged entity fully integrated US Airways' former hubs. From
Figure 2 compared to Figure 1, we can see that the network of the merged entity was much more
well-connected compared to 2011, thanks to the merger. In particular, the new American Airlines
was able to expand its business along the east coast, which was a major reason to seek a merger
with US Airways.
Overall, this section shows that there were signicant changes to the post-merger network of the
merged entity. Thus, it is crucial to take into account these changes in an ex-post analysis of the
merger.
[Include Table 6]
[Include Figures 1 and 2]
3.3 A descriptive analysis of the merger: impact on prices
Table 7 displays the mean price in 2011 and 2016 as a function of the market structure. Overall
prices decreased by 6.59%. At rst sight, the merger may have led to this price decrease. However,
as mentioned before, fuel prices substantially decreased between 2011 and 2016, aecting marginal
costs. These marginal cost changes need to be controlled for, in order to study the merger's price
eects. This price change is however heterogeneous among markets. A few markets exhibit a price
increase, mainly when only one of the two entities was present. It is often said that US Airways
9As for Tables 4 and 5, we do not report the betweenness as it does not provide any noteworthy information.
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was behaving more aggressively pre-merger than the other legacy carriers.10 This behavior may
positively aect prices post-merger if the merged entity no longer acts as aggressively. However,
these markets concern only around 12% of the passengers of our sample. In the next section, we
introduce our structural model to disentangle the direct merger eect on these prices from the
changes in preferences and marginal costs.
[Include Table 7]
4 Model
To examine consumer and rm behavior in the US airline industry, we build and estimate a struc-
tural model of demand and supply for ights. On the demand side, the goal is to identify consumer
preferences for dierent ight characteristics and their price elasticity. On the supply side, the goal
is to determine how specic product attributes aect the marginal cost of serving a given ight.
Once estimated, the model allows us to perform a rich set of counterfactuals to analyze the eect
of mergers.
We make two critical assumptions. First, we assume that airlines take their network of segments
to serve as given. Endogenizing network choices poses a burden, both conceptually and computa-
tionally, and is outside of the scope of this paper. However, we are evaluating the merger ex-post, so
we observe the post-merger network structure and account for it. Second, we refrain from modeling
airlines' frequency and capacity choices. The rationale behind this decision is that we are mainly
interested in how mergers aect prices and network structure.
4.1 Demand
We model demand using a nested logit demand model (Berry, 1994). In this section, we present
the main results, which are known in the empirical IO literature but are reported here to be self-
contained. In market t, the consumer can choose to either y between the two cities by choosing
10We have not been able to nd strong statistical evidence after the analysis of our estimated results. See subsection
5.3, last paragraph.
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one of the inside products (direct and one-stop ights) j ∈ Jt or to consume the outside option
(product 0), which means traveling by other means or not traveling at all. Following the literature
on demand estimation in airline markets, the inside products are grouped into the rst nest whereas
the second nest is only composed of the outside option. The utility of consumer i in market t from
purchasing product j ∈ Jt (an inside product) is
uijt = xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt + εijt(λ), (1)
where xjt is a vector of observed product attributes, pjt is the price of the product, and ξjt represents
product attributes unobserved by the researcher.11 We normalize the utility of purchasing the
outside option (product 0) to ui0t = ηi0t where ηi0t is an identically and independently distributed
(across consumers) "logit error" following the terminology of Berry and Jia (2010). εijt(λ) is an
idiosyncratic taste shock for product j in market t unobserved by the researcher. We assume it
follows the distribution necessary to yield the familiar nested logit market share function, i.e., a
generalized extreme value distribution. The nesting parameter λ ∈ (0, 1) governs the substitution
patterns between the two nests. As λ approaches 0, all substitution occurs within the nests. When
λ approaches 1, the model collapses into a simple logit model. We dene θd ≡ (β, α, λ) to be the
vector of parameters to be estimated.
When λ ∈ (0, 1], the share of people choosing product j ∈ Jt in market t among the set of
people consuming an inside product, the within-group share, is given by




with δjt = xjtβ − αpjt + ξjt being the "mean utility" of product j.
The percentage of people ying in market t is








which allows us to dene the market share of product j 6= 0 proposed in market t as
sjt(xt, pt, ξt; θd) = sj|f,t(xt, pt, ξt; θd)× sft(xt, pt, ξt; θd). (4)
11In the following xt, pt and ξt denote the vector of collected xjt, pjt and ξjt, across all inside products proposed
in market t.
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Similarly, the market share of the outside option is equal to










) = xjtβ − αpjt + (1− λ) ln(sj|f,t) + ξjt. (6)
All terms in equation (6) but ξjt and θd being observed, one can estimate θd ≡ (β, α, λ) by
regression techniques, ξjt playing the role of the error term. However, since the demand-side un-
observables, ξjt, realize before rms choose prices, there is a correlation between prices and these
unobservables, and similarly, between ξjt and the within-group share sj|f,t. Typically, a more de-
manded product (i.e. with a higher value of ξjt) is priced higher at equilibrium and has a higher
market share. Therefore, equation (6) can be estimated by 2SLS. A discussion of the choice of
product attributes and instruments is provided in Section 5.
4.2 Supply
We model the static prot-maximizing price decisions of all the airlines in each market t. We assume
that they play a Nash-Bertrand pricing game. For each market t, the prot maximization of airline
f determines its pricing strategy. Observe that an airline may oer more than one product; for
example, a direct ight and one-stop ight through its hub. Therefore, each rm chooses the set of






(pjt −mcjt)sjt(xt, pt, ξt; θd)Mt, (7)
where Jft collects all products oered by rm f in market t with ∪f∈FJft = Jt. Also, mcjt is
the marginal cost of oering product j and Mt is the market size of market t (dened here as the
geometric mean of the population at the endpoint metropolitan areas). Together, sjtMt give the
number of consumers (passengers) choosing product (ight) j in market t. The rst-order condition
with respect to the price of product j writes
∂Πft
∂pjt






(xt, pt, ξt; θd) = 0, (8)
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giving us the standard trade-o between reducing the price to gain a higher market share and
increasing the price to collect a higher markup, while internalizing the eect of product j's price on
other products oered by the rm in the same market.
The market shares are observed from the data and their derivatives with respect to prices can
be estimated from the estimation of the demand. Therefore, the previous equation allows us to
estimate the markups (or equivalently, the marginal costs) for all products proposed by all rms.
For counterfactual analysis, we want to explain how markups are dependent on product attributes.
Therefore, we specify the marginal cost function for product j as
mcjt = wjtθs + ζjt, (9)
with wjt a vector of observed marginal cost shifters and ζjt a marginal cost shock not observed by
the researcher. The vector of parameters to be estimated is θs. The choice of the product attributes
in the marginal cost equation is detailed below. Equation (9) can be estimated by OLS.
4.3 Estimation procedure
As explained above, the parameters of the demand side need to be estimated with Instrumental
Variables (for both the price and the within-group share), whereas the parameters of the marginal
cost specication only require OLS techniques. However, observe that the marginal costs in (9) are
estimated from the demand side and not observed. We should take this uncertainty into account
while computing the standard errors of the estimated θs. Standard econometric procedures are
available to correct for this parameter uncertainty.
However, estimating demand and supply jointly allows us to take into account the potential
correlation between demand shocks and marginal cost shocks. Therefore, the joint estimation
increases eciency, resulting in shorter condence intervals for both the demand and marginal
cost parameters, θd and θs. Therefore, we estimate the demand and supply-side jointly using the
Generalized Method of Moments (see Hansen, 1982). Since we have linear models for both the
demand and the supply, estimating both sides jointly comes at a negligible computational burden.
More details are given in Appendix C.2.
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5 Results and analysis
5.1 Specication
On the demand side, we let the utility of purchasing a product depend on several attributes. We
select them following the literature (Berry and Jia, 2010; Ciliberto and Williams, 2014). The
attributes we consider are the mean price, Price, which is endogenous, the number of stops (Stops)
to account for the fact that consumers value direct and one-stop ights dierently, and the maximum
number of direct connections oered out of the endpoints (Connections). An airline serving more
destinations out of an airport can enhance the value of frequent yer programs, for instance. We
also include the distance (in thousand miles) between the endpoint cities (Distance) and its square
(Distance2 ) to allow for distance to aect utility non-linearly. Finally, we include a set of carrier
dummies to capture consumer preferences for dierent airlines.
On the supply side, we let the marginal cost depend on the number of stops (Stops), a hub dummy
(Hub) equal to one if an endpoint or connecting airport is a hub for the airline, zero otherwise,
and the distance (in thousand miles) between the endpoint cities (Distance). We allow for two sets
of parameters: one for short and medium-haul ights (radial distance less than 1,500 miles) and
another for long-haul ights (distance higher than 1,500 miles). We do so to account for the fact
that airlines use dierent types of aircraft for these two types of routes. As for the demand side,
we also include carrier dummies to pick up systematic marginal cost dierences across airlines.
5.2 Instruments
Since the demand-side unobservables, ξjt, realize before rms choose prices, there is a correlation
between prices and these unobservables. Also, the within-group share sj|g,t in equation (2) is a
function of price and hence endogenous. We build instruments in the spirit of Berry and Jia (2010),
which are a variant of the instruments proposed by Berry et al. (1995). The idea behind these
instruments is that close substitutes in the space of products' attributes constrain a product's price.
Functions of rival rm product attributes then serve as a proxy for the level of competition a
given product faces. Similarly, attributes of other products produced by the same rm will aect
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pricing behavior (see equation (8)). In this vein, we use the percentage of rival products that are
direct ights, the total number of rival products, the percentage of direct ights in a market, the
number of competitors, and a dummy indicating whether a market is a monopoly. We also employ
exogenous cost shifters, such as dummies, indicating that at least one of the endpoints is a hub
and the number of direct connections oered out of the endpoints. Finally, we include interactions
between the instruments.
5.3 Results
We present the estimation results for our GMM estimation of the demand side and the supply side
in Table 8. Following the standard GMM procedure, we select our instruments, being mindful that
including too many instruments may lead to biased estimates but that incorporating a sucient
number of them guarantees the stability of our estimates, provided the overidentication test is not
rejected by the data. With our nal choice of instruments, the degree of overidentication is equal
to 5 for the 2011 data and 4 for the 2016 data. The J-test statistics are equal to 4.43 and 5.69,
respectively and, therefore, we do not reject the overidentication test, for the usual test levels (5%
or 1%). Also, we report the F-test statistics for the rst stage of the 2SLS demand estimation to
assess that our instruments are not weak. The values are equal to 479 and 683 for the price in 2011
and 2016, and 845 and 1009 for the within-group market share sj|g. These results give us strong
reasons to believe that we do not face any problems related to weak instruments (see Stock et al.,
2002) and that both our estimates and the estimated standard errors are reliable.
[Include Table 8]
The nesting parameter λ lies between zero and one, and is statistically signicant, suggesting
that substitution between the inside and outside products exists. In other words, when the price
of a ight increases, passengers may decide to switch to another inside product or to not y at
all. The price coecients for both years are negative, which aligns with our expectations and
standard economic theory. We report the (mean) own price elasticity estimates in Table 9 with
their corresponding 95% asymptotic condence interval.12 The absolute values of the estimates
12The condence intervals are calculated by simulating 1000 draws of the parameter θd from its asymptotic distri-
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of own-price elasticities are lower in 2016 than in 2011 though the dierence is not statistically
signicant. Therefore, we can-not reject the assumption that the price elasticity is the same in
2011 and 2016. Berry and Jia (2010) nd an increase in price elasticities between 1999 and 2006
and attribute it to the emergence of search engines and online ticketing services. Both factors have
increased customers' ability to gather information and compare prices. However, as customers were
already accustomed to online service and air travel during the 2010s, a stability in price elasticity
is plausible.
The distance estimates imply a U-shape dependence of utility on distance. Most of the literature
nds an inverse U-shape. However, most of the products in our dataset have a distance value
corresponding to the increasing part of the distance function. This nding is consistent with the
estimates of Ciliberto and Williams (2014) who have a similar denition of the products. Most of
their observations also lie on the increasing part of the inverse U-shape function. Moreover, in our
robustness analysis (see Appendix B), including only the distance does not modify the outcomes of
our model. Finally, we still get the U-shape across several other robustness checks that we present
in the same appendix.
A negative estimate of the number of stops shows passengers' preference for direct ights. Note
that the variable Stops is not conditional on distance, so it measures the disutility incurred by a
consumer while holding distance constant. We also display the connection semi-elasticity in Table
9, as well as its 95% condence interval. It measures the percentage change in a product's demand
when a direct ight becomes a connecting ight, ceteris paribus. We nd that consumers have a
higher aversion toward indirect ights in 2016, in line with a trend already found by Berry and Jia
(2010) who exploit data from 1999 and 2006. It is dicult to directly compare our values (61.5% for
2011 and 70.9% for 2016) with those estimated in Berry and Jia (2010) because we do not have the
same denition of products nor the same model. However, we do have the same order of magnitude.
The eect of an airline's network size on consumers' utility, captured by Connections, is pos-
itive. One reason for this nding is that more ights increase the attraction of loyalty programs
to customers. With a larger number of connections at an airport, a carrier can also provide better
service and more convenient gate access for customers (Berry and Jia, 2010). The carrier-specic
bution and by reporting the 25th and 975th values.
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taste parameters suggest that, in 2011, American Airlines and US Airways were more popular than
Delta Airlines. Nonetheless, Delta Airlines became more popular in 2016 than the merged entity
American Airlines. Note that the reference group for both years is United Airlines.
We allow for two sets of marginal cost parameters: one for short-distance markets and the other
for long-distance markets. There exist two opposite eects of the number of stops on marginal
costs. On the one hand, connecting airports could generate economies of scale by transmitting
more passengers, which lowers the marginal cost. On the other hand, the extra volume of trac
would cause higher coordination and management costs and lead to additional fuel consumption at
landings and takeos, which increases the marginal cost. Hence, the coecient's sign reects the
trade-o between these two eects (Berry et al., 2006; Berry and Jia, 2010). There is no statistical
evidence of economies of scale, even for long routes in 2011. The coordination cost eect seems
to dominate any economies of scale. The same reasoning can apply to the hub parameters since
hubs mostly function as connecting points. Unlike most previous literature, our results suggest
that ights involving hubs have a higher cost, which implies the increasing cost of coordination and
fuel prevails over the scale economies. Marginal cost also increases with distance, even for the long
routes.
Tables 10 and 11 show average prots, prices, marginal costs, and markups at dierent levels in
both years, respectively. These tables reveal that the marginal costs of connecting ights are indeed
higher than for direct ights. The marginal cost of operating a direct ight has decreased by 13.4%
between 2011 and 2016 (following the fuel price drop), whereas the marginal cost of operating a
connecting ight has remained broadly the same. Also, as expected, LCCs have lower marginal
costs, which aligns with the supply estimates.
Marginal costs for all airlines decreased substantially except for Southwest and Delta Airlines.
The marginal costs of the LCCs decreased more because the share of fuel cost in their operating
cost is higher. Airlines were more "protable" in 2016 than in 2011.
One of the reasons raised by the DoJ in its attempt to block the merger between American
Airlines and US Airways was the fear of increasing coordinated eects, such as an increase in tacit
collusion. Ciliberto and Williams (2014) give evidence that multimarket contact may facilitate tacit
collusion in a Bertrand price setting. Also, the merged entity internalizing its pricing externality
becomes less aggressive in its pricing behavior toward its remaining competitors (see Porter, 2020;
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Ivaldi and Lagos, 2017), essentially acting as if facing a higher marginal cost. The DoJ argued that
US Airways had a more aggressive pricing behavior toward the other legacy carriers when it oered
a connecting ight in a market in which one or more legacy carriers were operating directly. After
having carefully investigated the mean Lerner Index of the airlines in dierent market congurations,
we have not been able to nd any statistical evidence of these dierences in behavior, either before
or after the merger.13
5.4 Analysis of marginal costs
The main argument for allowing a merger often relies on cost savings that counterbalance the
upward pressure on pricing due to reduced competition. We take advantage of having marginal cost
estimates pre- and post-merger to quantify how the marginal costs of the new American Airlines
are related to the two production technologies of the two merging entities.
First, we compare the distributions of marginal costs for American Airlines and US Airways
pre- and post-merger. The results are displayed in Figure 3. As illustrated in Tables 10 and 11,
we observe a shift toward the left of the distribution mainly driven by the drop in fuel price (see
also Figure 4, which displays the distributions for Delta Airlines, United Airlines and SouthWest
Airlines).
[Include Figures 3 and 4]
Our objective is to compare the distribution of marginal costs for US Airways and American
Airlines pre- and post-merger. As illustrated above, directly comparing these distributions would
be misleading due to the changes in fuel price between 2011 and 2016. Therefore, for every ight
proposed by US Airways or American Airlines in 2011, we need to impute a value for what would
have been the marginal cost of the same product, had US Airways and American not merged
between these dates.
To do so, we estimate the distribution of marginal costs for ights proposed by Delta Airlines
and United Airlines in 2011 and in 2016. We assume that the rank of the marginal cost of a ight
proposed by US Airways or American Airlines in 2011 would have stayed constant in 2016. For
13These tables are available upon request directly from the authors.
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example, if the marginal cost of a ight proposed by US Airways corresponds to the median of the
marginal costs of ights proposed by Delta Airlines and United Airlines in 2011, its imputed value
for 2016 is the median of the distribution of marginal costs of ights proposed by Delta Airlines
and United Airlines in 2016. This scenario appears to be the most plausible to impute the marginal
cost values for counterfactuals that are not observed. Berry and Jia (2010) proceed similarly to
input the unobserved component ξjt in their counterfactuals.
14 We apply this procedure for direct
and connecting ights separately.
Figure 5 displays the new distributions (direct ights on the left panel, connecting ights on
the right panel). The distribution of American Airlines in 2016 seems to be a mix between the
two former distributions. To test it formally, we run a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to decide which
distribution ts the distribution of the marginal costs of the new American Airlines in 2016 best. We
consider ve candidates: the distribution of American in 2011 "translated" to 2016, the distribution
of US in 2011 "translated" to 2016, the distribution which corresponds to the maximum of the two
previous distributions, the distribution corresponding to the minimum, and the average of these
two distributions. Remember that, pre-merger, American Airlines and US Airways were proposing
approximately the same number of ights. The average represents a union of the two former
technologies without any cost reduction.
[Include Figure 5]
The corresponding test statistics are reported in Table 12. The critical value for a 5% level test
is 1.35, meaning we reject all tests but the rst one and the average for the direct ights, and we
reject all tests but the average for the connecting ights. Therefore, it seems plausible under our
assumptions that the merger-related eciency gains take time to materialize. In 2016, claiming that
the production technology of the new entity is just the union of the production technologies of the
two former entities is not rejected by the data. In fact, the administrative burden of combining two
rms, as well as the need to synchronize baggage handling operations, and the decision of the DoJ
to force American Airlines to maintain some ights (in particular from/to the former hubs of US
Airways) have generated some frictions which have so far prevented the new entity from improving
on its production costs.




As illustrated in Table 7, the mean price of a ticket has decreased in the markets we consider between
2011 and 2016.15 However, many changes occurred in the meantime. In particular, marginal costs
decreased, largely due to the drop in fuel price.16 We estimate a 13.4% marginal cost decrease for
a direct ight. Also, the preferences of consumers have shifted toward direct ights and, in 2016,
more than 80% of passengers take direct ights in our sample. In our counterfactual analysis, we
aim to disentangle the eects of each change that occurred between 2011 and 2016. Our structural
model is ideally suited for carrying out such a decomposition.
6.1 Deriving the change in prices due to changes in marginal costs and
demand
First, we would like to estimate what the prices of the ights proposed in 2011 would be had
they been proposed in 2016. This is Scenario 1, and our objective is to compare the outcome of
this scenario with the reality of 2016. In this scenario, there is no merger between US Airways
and American Airlines. Also, all airlines propose the same products as in 2011 (no entry/exit by
anybody) and compete as in 2011. However, marginal costs and consumer preferences change.
To do so, we take the estimates θd and θs of both the demand and marginal cost of 2016 and
recompute the utility and marginal cost for each ight proposed in 2011 but evaluated with the
2016 preferences and costs. The natural question that arises is how to impute the new value of
the unobserved product attribute ξjt. Indeed, ξjt plays a crucial role in determining the utility
and, consequently, the market share of the corresponding product. As mentioned in Berry and Jia
(2010), the dierence between ξjt in 2016 and ξjt in 2011 "is a combination of changes in taste and
15We recall that all prices are expressed in 2011 US$
16From 3.3 US$ per gallon to 1.20 US$ per gallon for the USA Daily Spot Prices for Kerosene. Source: USA
Energy Information Administration. https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm
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changes in unobserved product characteristics". We impute the new value of ξjt in our scenario by
keeping its rank constant, as in Berry and Jia (2010).
To be more specic, we estimate the demand for 2011 and 2016 from which we can recover the
distribution of the ξ's for both years studied. If ξ̂, for a given product, corresponds to the rst
quartile of the distribution in 2011, the imputed value for Scenario 1 is the rst quartile of the
distribution estimated in 2016. More generally, if the quantile of ξ̂ is γ, the imputed value is the
quantile γ of the distribution estimated in 2016. We do the same for imputing the 2016 value of
the ζ's, the unobserved cost shocks.17
Table 13 displays the percentage changes in sales-weighted prices (weighted by the number of
passengers in each market) and consumer surplus. Overall, we see that prices have decreased by
around 6.59%, but would have decreased by 6.73% between 2011 and 2016 because of changes in
marginal costs and preferences. In terms of prices, the merger (jointly with its impact on airlines
strategies) slightly increased prices. However, in the previous section, we provide evidence that
the merged entity has not yet realized any cost savings from the merger.18 On the other hand,
consumer surplus has increased by 14.35%. Less than half of this increase can be attributed to the
changes in preferences and marginal costs, suggesting that the merger (and the rationalization of
airlines' networks) did increase consumer surplus. In the next part, we present additional scenarios
to estimate these networks' eects.
[Include Table 13]
6.2 Decomposition of the merger steps
We consider additional scenarios to disentangle the pure merger eect from changes in the networks
of the dierent airlines. However, it would be fair to say that we are not able to distinguish which
entries of competitors (LCC in particular) are directly linked to the merger and which would have
occurred nevertheless. We consider three scenarios to lead us from the outcome of Scenario 1 to
the actual situation in 2016.
17See Berry and Jia (2010), Section V.C .
18An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate whether any cost savings have been realized
later.
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• Scenario 2: AA and US merge
In Scenario 2, we assume joint prot maximization by American Airlines and US Airways, but
keep the set-up of Scenario 1 otherwise. The only dierence between Scenario 1 and Scenario
2 is that the merged entity now internalizes the eects of changing prices on all products
proposed by American Airlines and US Airways. This scenario allows us to back out the pure
price eect of the merger (see Appendix C.1 for further details).
• Scenario 3: the new American Airlines updates its network
In Scenario 3, we update Scenario 2 by allowing the new entity "American Airlines" to reop-
timize its network. We do so by updating its product oerings to those actually proposed in
2016. Similarly, we update the error terms of demand and supply, ξjt and ζjt , to the actual
estimates from 2016 for the products oered by American Airlines. Note that we restrict the
product oerings of all other rms to remain as those we observe in 2011. Hence, we have a
data set in which we combine the products oered by the new American Airlines in 2016 with
those oered by competitors in 2011. Doing so allows us to isolate the impact of the merging
rm's post-merger network re-alignment.
• Scenario 4: Competitors update their network
We move from the outcome of Scenario 3 to the actual market situation in 2016 with Scenario
4. Here, we allow competitors to update their networks. We do so by updating their product
oerings to those we observe in 2016. We also use their 2016 estimates for the error terms of
both demand and supply, which allows us to estimate the eect of the changes in competitors'
product oerings. However, it is dicult to know which fraction of this change is actually a
pure reaction to the merger and which would have occurred absent the merger. Disentangling
these forces would require a model that endogenizes the market structure, which is beyond
the scope of this paper.
These scenarios allow us to perform a detailed step-by-step evaluation of the merger. Having
pre- and post-merger data means we do not have to rely on ad-hoc assumptions regarding the
post-merger network structure. Ciliberto et al. (2020) and Bontemps et al. (2021) both show that
such ad-hoc assumptions strongly drive the analysis. Both also provide ways to take into account
changes in network structure in an ex-ante analysis where post-merger data is not (yet) available.
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Tables 14 and 15 display the percentage changes in sales-weighted prices (weighted by the
number of passengers in each market) and consumer surplus across scenarios. Column 2 in the
consumer surplus table reports the observed changes between 2011 and 2016. The rst line recaps
the information across markets. Then, we decompose the changes according to the market situation
in 2011, as in Table 13.
[Include Tables 14 and 15]
Overall, we see that prices did not vary much when the networks were updated. In Scenario
2, mechanically, prices increase because one competitor vanished, but this increase was very small
(+0.05%). This is mainly because, often, the merging entities were competing with at least two other
big competitors. Also, there was little overlap in the networks of American Airlines and US Airways,
especially when considering direct ights. In Scenario 3, when American Airlines is rationalizing its
post-merger network, prices increase slightly (+0.12%) and in Scenario 4, they decrease only very
slightly. Overall, the merger and the re-optimization of airlines' strategies induced a price increase
of +0.15%.
On the other hand, consumer surplus has increased, especially in Scenario 4. We saw in Scenario
1 that less than half of the consumer surplus increase is due to the drop in marginal costs and changes
in preferences. Most of the remaining part is due to the competitors of American Airlines adapting
to the new situation by entering new markets and increasing competition.
This global analysis hides heterogeneity across dierent market structures, especially for the
consumer surplus. We see that in markets where both American Airlines and US Airways were
present before the merger, consumer surplus increased by more than in the no-merger scenario.
Again, this nding underlines the fact that competitive pressure and new entries (or threats of
entries) kept prices from increasing too much. Also, stronger consumer tastes for a more extensive
network and an expanded network post-merger led to higher consumer surplus.
On the other hand, consumer surplus absent the merger would have been higher in markets
where only one of the merging parties was present before the merger. Consumers in these markets
saw less new entry of competitors, which may explain this result.
Finally, we see that in markets where neither merging party was present, the re-optimization
of the competitors' networks harms consumers considerably (-31.23% change in consumer surplus).
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However, this only concerns 26 markets (0.2% of the passengers), some of which saw airlines leave
for reasons that may be unrelated to the merger.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the merger between American Airlines and US Airways and in particular,
its impact on the US domestic market connecting the top metropolitan areas. Fuel prices dropped
substantially in the period under scrutiny, having a high impact on production costs.
We estimate a structural model of demand for and supply of dierentiated products from the
US Department of Transportation data collecting a 10% random sample in the second quarters of
2011 and 2016. We nd that the mean price has decreased by 6.59% but estimate that, without the
merger, the mean price would have dropped by 6.73%. The merger with rms' subsequent reactions
and adaptations to the new consumer tastes explain the gap. It is worth noting that, following
Berry and Jia (2010), the shift in consumer preferences toward direct ights - which tend to be
more expensive - has continued. This trend also explains part of this relative increase in prices. In
addition, we do not nd evidence of any cost savings in the merging entities.
Breaking down the results by market structure, we nd that consumers in markets where both
American and US Airways were present in 2011 beneted from the merger, even if prices did not
change because of that. This fact is mainly due to the entry of LCCs and to a lesser extent, a more
extensive network of the merged entity. On the other hand, consumers in markets where only one
of the merging parties was present would have enjoyed a higher consumer surplus without a merger.
Overall, these ndings suggest that merger remedies, such as slot divestiture at LaGuardia, that
gave LCCs and Southwest Airlines slots worked well.
In our simulations, entry of either low-cost or other legacy carriers often osets the eect of
a decrease in the number of legacy carriers. We nd this pattern mainly in markets where the
two merging entities were both operating before the merger. Modeling the endogeneity of the entry
behavior is beyond the scope of this paper. It has been tackled by Ciliberto et al. (2020) and requires
the use of moment inequalities to endogenize these decisions. There is, however, the necessity to
provide empirical researchers with tools to deal with it while using standard econometric techniques,
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at the price of adding some assumptions, such as in the entry game literature.
Finally, it is worth noting that doing our simulation ex-post allows us to consider the shifts
in both supply and demand. Merger analysis is often conducted ex-ante and rarely done ex-post.
Having pre- and post-merger data enables us to decompose the eect of the merger. It also prevents
us from having to make ad-hoc assumptions on the post-merger network structure that have been
shown to strongly inuence the analysis.
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A Tables and Figures
A.1 Tables
Note that in the following tables, AA stands for American Airlines, UA stands for United Airlines,
US stands for US Airways, DL stands for Delta Airlines, WN stands for Southwest and LCC stands
for all the other carriers.
Table 1: Product-level descriptive statistics
Variable Mean (2011) std dev. (2011) Mean (2016) std dev. (2016)
Price (100 USD) 1.94 0.97 1.82 0.91
Number of Stops 0.15 0.34 0.12 0.32
Connections (100) 0.34 0.14 0.36 0.15
Distance (1000 miles) 1.06 0.78 1.09 0.77
Product share 0.37 0.14 0.34 0.13
Observations 17540 19295
Notes: The mean values for the price and number of stops are weigthed by the number of passengers.
Number of stops varies between zero and one due to sample selection. Connections is the maximum
number of connections at the segment endpoints (origin and destination). Product share is the market
share among the ying options, excluding the outside option.
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Table 2: Market-level descriptive statistics
Variable Mean (2011) std dev. (2011) Mean (2016) std dev. (2016)
Number of Products
per market
14.97 9.22 16.44 9.90
Number of Airlines per market 5.43 1.72 4.81 1.51
Direct Passengers (1000) 42.02 96.49 55.47 123.06
Connecting Passengers(1000) 7.14 7.76 7.62 7.86
Number of Markets 1171 1174
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Table 3: Airline-level descriptive statistics
Airline Market No. Mkt No. Direct No. connecting Number of
share served Flights products Products
Year: 2011
DL 17.7% 1144 326 3360 3686
UA 15.3% 1112 366 3160 3526
US 9.8% 999 316 1850 2166
AA 12.6% 950 245 1715 1960
WN 26.7% 895 673 3622 4295
LCC 17.8% 511 285 969 1254
Year: 2016
AA 21.3% 1157 417 4088 4505
DL 17.1% 1123 287 3338 3625
UA 13.5% 1119 302 3097 3399
WN 27.5% 1080 730 5012 5742
LCC 20.6% 621 506 1518 2024
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Table 4: Graph-level descriptive statistics of networks (2011)
All AA US AA+US UA DL WN LCC
Number of cities 49 48 48 49 49 49 43 44
Number of Links 968 245 316 468 366 326 673 214
Average path Length 1.18 1.79 1.73 1.6 1.69 1.72 1.25 1.9
Average degree 39.51 10.21 13.17 19.1 14.94 13.31 31.3 9.73
Average Closeness 0.86 0.57 0.59 0.64 0.61 0.6 0.81 0.54
Table 5: Graph-level descriptive statistics of networks (2016)
All AA UA DL WN LCC
Number of cities 49 49 49 49 48 46
Number of Links 912 417 302 287 730 367
Path Length 1.22 1.65 1.74 1.77 1.35 1.67
Average degree 37.22 17.02 12.33 11.71 30.42 15.96
Average closeness 0.84 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.76 0.61
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Table 6: Top inuential nodes before and after the merger
Airport Airline Degree Closeness Airport Degree Closeness
2011 2011 2016 2016
Year: 2011 Year: 2016
CLT US 45 0.96 CLT 47 0.98
ORD AA 42 0.90 ORD 46 0.96
DFW AA 45 0.96 DFW 45 0.94
PHL US 42 0.90 PHL 44 0.92
MIA AA 35 0.80 MIA 42 0.89
DCA US 34 0.78 DCA 41 0.87
JFK AA 32 0.76 JFK 39 0.84
JFK US 28 0.71
LAX AA 25 0.68 LAX 35 0.79
PHX US 33 0.77 PHX 35 0.79
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Table 7: Market prices by market structure in 2011
Market structure 2011 Price Price ∆ in% 2011 No. markets
2011 2016 Pax share
Overall
194.33 181.52 -6.59% 100.00 1171
AA and US present
2 rms 131.51 114.39 -13.02% 0.64 4
3 rms 211.27 189.73 -10.20% 9.54 162
4 rms 196.04 180.23 -8.06% 77.36 638
AA or US present
1 rm 232.33 286.68 +23.39% 0.02 7
2 rms 180.93 202.49 +11.92% 0.70 26
3 rms 186.48 188.91 +1.30% 3.02 93
4 rms 168.71 176.83 +4.81% 8.53 215
None present
1-3 rms 179.25 180.90 +0.92% 0.18 26
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Table 8: Structural estimates
Utility Marginal Cost
2011 2016 2011 2016
Mean utility Short-haul ights
Intercept -3.332 -2.690 Intercept 1.348 1.112
(0.187) (0.188) (0.032) (0.031)
Price -1.723 -1.582 Stops 0.148 0.372
(0.120) (0.109) (0.018) (0.018)
Stops -1.397 -1.845 Distance 0.278 0.198
(0.056) (0.063) (0.028) (0.027)
Connections 3.721 2.111 Hub 0.221 0.203
(0.289) (0.200) (0.019) (0.017)
Distance -0.293 -0.463 Long-haul ights
(0.060) (0.055)
Distance2 0.224 0.201 Intercept 0.857 0.641
(0.024) (0.021) (0.055) (0.050)
Nesting Parameter (λ) 0.711 0.741 Stops -0.035 0.097





Carrier FEs Carrier FEs
AA 0.356 0.261 AA -0.024 0.257
(0.047) (0.033) (0.027) (0.021)
DL 0.150 0.387 DL -0.116 0.034
(0.039) (0.035) (0.024) (0.021)
US 0.620 US 0.131
(0.049) (0.025)
WN -0.896 -0.732 WN -0.250 -0.083
(0.073) (0.055) (0.019) (0.018)
LCC -0.030 -1.065 LCC -0.436 -0.588
(0.056) (0.086) (0.026) (0.026)
Statistics
J-statistic 4.433 5.690 Number of observations 17540 19295
Note: Prices are in USD 1,00. Endpoint Fixed Eects included. Over-identifying restrictions: 5 for
2011 and 4 for 2016.
37
Table 9: Average elasticity estimates and 95% condence intervals
2011 2016
Est. 95%CI Est. 95%CI
Own-price elasticity -4.16 (-4.80, -3.56) -3.49 (-4.16, -2.89)
Connection Semi-elasticity -0.615 (-0.639, -0.584) -0.709 (-0.728, -0.686)
Table 10: Prots Breakdown (2011)
Prots (100k) Price Marginal Cost Markup Lerner Index
All Flights 42.50 194.33 146.75 47.58 0.27
Direct Flights 49.54 188.53 140.31 48.22 0.28
Connecting Flights 1.03 228.49 184.67 43.82 0.20
AA 33.91 215.15 168.50 46.66 0.23
US 15.78 213.21 166.84 46.38 0.24
UA 30.18 238.51 192.64 45.87 0.21
DL 29.11 213.97 165.55 48.42 0.25
WN 74.64 167.69 117.62 50.07 0.32
LCC 39.82 161.40 115.20 46.21 0.31
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Table 11: Prots Breakdown (2016)
Prots (100k) Price Marginal Cost Markup Lerner Index
All Flights 52.90 181.52 128.79 52.74 0.33
Direct Flights 60.00 174.60 121.46 53.14 0.35
Connecting Flights 1.20 231.94 182.16 49.78 0.23
AA 45.73 196.30 143.24 53.07 0.29
UA 41.79 217.86 167.16 50.70 0.25
DL 41.20 214.07 161.40 52.68 0.27
WN 76.91 166.04 111.27 54.77 0.35
LCC 45.22 136.29 85.23 51.06 0.46
Table 12: KS Test for the best t for AA 2016
Distribution AA US Max Min Average
Direct ights 1.14 1.38 3.54 3.39 1.32
Connecting ights 1.95 2.20 7.35 8.50 0.89
95% critical value is equal to 1.35
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Table 13: Scenario 1 - changes in preferences and marginal costs
Market structure 2011 No of
markets









1171 -6.73% -6.59% +6.67% +14.35%
AA and US present
3 rms 4 -3.24% -12.71% +8.02% +34.96%
4 rms 162 -0.78% -9.87% +8.90% +24.68%
5 rms 638 -7.05% -7.73% +5.08% +15.86%
AA or US present
1 rm 7 -7.57% +23.84% +35.78% +18.67%
2 rms 26 +4.14% +12.33% +19.64% +1.40%
3 rms 93 +1.37% +1.67% +19.33% +3.49%
4 rms 215 -1.18% +5.19% +11.32% -2.83%
None present
None present 26 +7.94% +1.10% +17.18% -16.66%
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Table 14: Market prices by scenario and market structure in 2011
Market structure 2011 Change 2011-2016 Changes in%












-6.59% -6.73% +0.05% +0.12% -0.02%
AA and US present
3 rms -12.71% -3.86% +0.02% -3.08% -6.33%
4 rms -9.87% -2.39% +0.10% -0.40% -7.39%
5 rms -7.73% -7.94% +0.06% -0.04% +0.21%
AA or US present
1 rm 23.84% -8.02% 0.00% +34.26% +0.28%
2 rms 12.33% +1.16% 0.00% +2.94% +7.87%
3 rms 1.67% -1.37% 0.00% +2.14% +0.92%
4 rms 5.19% -3.40% 0.00% +1.01% +7.80%
None present
None present 1.10% +0.13% 0.00% +0.61% +0.36%
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Table 15: Market consumer surplus by scenario and market structure in 2011
Market structure 2011 Change 2011-2016 Changes in%












+14.35% +6.67% -0.27% +1.23% +6.18%
AA and US present
3 rms 34.96% +8.02% -0.05% +9.49% +14.17%
4 rms 24.68% +8.90% -0.41% +4.22% +10.31%
5 rms 15.86% +5.08% -0.31% +1.14% +9.35%
AA or US present
1 rm 18.67% +35.78% 0.00% +12.44% -22.27%
2 rms 1.40% +19.64% 0.00% -0.04% -15.21%
3 rms 3.49% +19.33% 0.00% -3.36% -10.26%
4 rms -2.83% +11.32% 0.00% +0.15% -12.84%
None present
None present -16.66% +17.18% 0.00% +3.42% -31.23%
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A.2 List of Figures
(a) Network of AA (2011) (b) Network of US (2011)
Notes: In these gures, the size of the node is constructed based on the normalized degree value of each node, and
the width of the curve representing a link between two cities is associated with the number of passengers traveling
through such a route. Red nodes in the graphs indicate the hubs for the airline. Most of the thick curves in the
gures involve the hubs, and most large nodes are red suggesting that the hubs indeed undertake a higher volume
of trac. Besides, as the graphs suggest, the hubs of American Airlines were more evenly distributed while US
Airways emphasized its business more along the east coast. Overall, Dallas could be the most important node for
American Airlines, and Charlotte was the most inuential node for US Airways.
Figure 1: Networks of American Airlines (AA) and US Airways (US) (2011)
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(a) Network of AA + US (2011) (b) Network of AA (2016)
Notes: see Figure 1 for explanations.
Figure 2: Networks of Merged Entities Before and After Merger










































Figure 3: Distribution of estimated Marginal Costs for direct ights of US and AA pre and post-
merger
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(a) Distribution for DL























(b) Distribution for UA




















(c) Distribution for WN
Figure 4: Distribution of estimated Marginal Costs for direct ights pre and post-merger



















































Figure 5: Distribution of estimated Marginal Costs of US and AA pre and post-merger / imputed
values.
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